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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the effects of changes in government
purchases in the context of a simple static neoclassical model. I show why
there can never be a multiplier in such a model under standard assumptions
about tastes and technology when the capital stock is held fixed. The
standard analysis is extended to include an examination of the effects of
changes in public sector employment. The introduction of public sector
employment means that we must be careful in choosing between alternative
empirical measures of the theoretical concept of aggregate output. Under
current national income accounting conventions, GNP may in fact fall in
response to increased government purchases.1. Introduction
The existence or otherwise of a 'multiplier' effect from changes in
government purchases to aggregate output has been a central issue in
macroeconomics since Keynes (1936). The textbook Keynesian model (see, for
example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1978)) predicts that an increase in government
purchases of goods and services will call forth an even greater increase in
production of these goods and services. However the existence of a multiplier
effect from government purchases to aggregate output was called into question
by Barro (1981) and Hall (1980). Reasoning from an equilibrium framework,
they argued that increases in government purchases always lead to smaller
(i.e. less than one-for-one) increases in aggregate output. They emphasized
the distinction between temporary and permanent changes in government
purchases, and argued that temporary increases (such as those associated with
military spending during wars) will have a greater output effect than
permanent increases. But even temporary increases, they concluded, will raise
output by a less than equal amount by crowding out some component of private
demand. Estimates in Hall (1986), for example, suggest that each extra dollar
of military spending raises GNP by only sixty two cents.
Recently this conclusion has been called into question by Baxter and
King (1990) and Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990). Both groups of
authors show that in the context of a fully specified dynamic general
equilibrium model, permanent increases in government purchases will raise
output by more than temporary increases, and by more than the increase in
purchases. The two groups of authors stress different reasons for the
difference between their results and those of Barro and Hall. Baxter and King
1
•emphasize the importance of endogenizing the capital accumulation decision,
while Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum emphasize the existence of an income
effect on leisure and complementarity between labor and capital in the
production function.
Some of the confusion on this issue stems from the fact that it is
generally impossible to find exact solutions to dynamic general equilibrium
models of the type commonly used for neoclassical analysis except under
certain restrictive assumptions. However static versions of the same models
are easier to deal with, and can help to clarify some of the issues associated
with the analysis of fiscal policy in the more complicated dynamic models.
Below I will illustrate the effects of changes in government purchases in a
simple static representative agent ("Robinson Crusoe") economy. I will
consider changes in both government purchases of goods and purchases of
services. About half of total government purchases of goods and services
consists of compensation of employees. Typically, analyses of the effects of
fiscal policy do not distinguish between government purchases of private
sector output and government purchases of labor services. Below I will show
that in the context of a neoclassical model the distinction is quite
important.
The analysis is best thought of as illustrating the effects of changes
in what Baxter and King refer to as "basic" government purchases, namely
purchases that do not augment the utility of consumers (except possibly in an
additively separable manner) nor augment the productivity of private factors
of production. The standard example of such purchases is of course those
undertaken by the military. I extend the standard analysis by introducing
public sector employment in a manner symmetric with purchases of output.
2Public sector employment detracts from the representative agent's time
endowment in a manner similar to time spent at private production.
Furthermore, the time spent working for the government does not enhance the
productivity of private factors of production.
Once public sector employment is introduced into the model, we need to
be careful about choosing empirical counterparts for the theoretical concepts
of aggregate output and government purchases of goods and services. Gross
National Product (GNP) is the measure of aggregate output most commonly used
in macroeconomic analysis.2 It is intended to measure the total output of all
factors of production owned or supplied by a country's residents. It is also
intended to include the output of the country's government. The output of the
government sector is defined to be equal to the compensation of government
employees because of the unobservable nature of the government's product.
Government purchases of goods and services consist of the sum of government
purchases of final goods and services from the private sector and compensation
of government employees. The existence or otherwise of a multiplier effect
from government purchases to aggregate output is then usually assessed by
looking at the relationship between GNP and total government purchases of
goods and services. However, because of the inclusion of compensation of
government employees in both series, the size of the multiplier effect is
potentially mismeasured.
Below I will show that in the context of a static neoclassical model
where increased government purchases of final output increase private
production, GNP as conventionally measured may in fact fall. Likewise
increased public sector employment which necessarily depresses private sector
output will also have an ambiguous effect on GNP. On the basis of simple
3
•estimates of some key parameters, however, it seems unlikely that we would
observe the perverse result of GNP falling in response to increased government
purchases. These same parameter estimates also suggest that multiplier
estimates based on GNP understate the expansionary effect of increased
government purchases on private sector output by about a third. The
distinction between GNP and private sector output also changes our impression
of how the U.S. economy behaved during World War I and World War II. The best
available data suggest that private sector output fell in both 1917 and 1918.
During World War II, the rate of growth of private sector output tapered off
rapidly after 1941, while GNP continued to grow at robust rates until 1944.
The post-World War 11 "depression" in 1946 looks a lot less severe when judged
in terms of the performance of private sector output (a 4.8-percent decline)
than when it is judged in terms of the performance of GNP (a massive 19.0-
percent decline). The paper concludes with some tentative estimates of the
differential effects of the two types of government purchases on aggregate
output.
2. How government is treated in the national accounts
The invention of national income accounting is one of the great
achievements of twentieth century economics. However, the practice of
measuring the aggregate output of goods and services produced in a country is
fraught with difficulties, and inevitably relies on accounting conventions
that seem arbitrary and result in strange anomalies. The treatment of
government is one of the more troublesome aspects of national accounting.
This stems from the fact that the output of government is not exchanged on any
market, thus making measurement of its value and volume quite difficult.
4Under current national income accounting conventions (see, for example, U.S.
Department of Commerce (1985)) output of the government sector is equated with
compensation of employees in that sector. Furthermore, all of the output
produced by the government is classified as final as opposed to intermediate
output. Thus it is added to the output of the business and household sectors
to arrive at aggregate output.
There are two obvious problems with the way government is treated in the
national income accounts. First, there can be little doubt that much of
government output currently classified as final output is in fact intermediate
output (Kuznets 1948, pp 156-157). The example most commonly used to
illustrate this point is the provision of policing and security services.
Police services provided by the government are treated as final output
(measured as the compensation of employees in police forces) while the same
services provided by private security companies are classified as intermediate
.
output used in the production of final output by the firms who hire them.
Leffler (1978) explored the consequences for international comparisons of
output of reallocating some of the components of government output from final
to intermediate classification. Horz and Reich (1982) and Reich (1986)
explore in greater detail the scope for separating intermediate from final
product for the government sector. Eisner and Nebhut (1981) and Eisner
(1989), on the other hand, adopt the more radical approach of classifying all
government output as intermediate.
The second obvious shortcoming of the current treatment of government
output in the national accounts has to do with the fact that no imputation is
made for the services of government capital. Eisner and Nebhut (1981) and
Eisner (1989) make such imputations for the United States for the post World
5War II period and find that this correction, in conjunction with a number of
other corrections, yields a figure for net government product that is more
than 50 per cent larger than the BEA measure (Eisner and Nebhut (1981), p.41).
In what follows, I want to explore the implications of the current
measurement conventions for the analysis of fiscal policy in a neoclassical
model. Thus the output of the government sector will be equated with
compensation of employees in government, and will all be classified as final
output.
3. Model
Consider an economy where the final output of the private sector, Y, is
produced using capital employed in the private sector, K, and labor employed
in the private sector, N, by means of a standard constant returns to scale
production function F(K,N). The stock of capital is fixed, while the level of
the labor input is determined by a standard labor-leisure trade off. Final
output is either consumed, C~ or appropriated by the government, G. The
single representative agent derives utility from consumption and leisure, L.
His preferences are summarized by the utility function U(C,L), which is
assumed to satisfy the usual concavity requirements. The agent is endowed
with a single unit of time each period, which must be divided between leisure,
private productive effort and working for the government, N 9 . Formally,
(1 )
Thus, working for the government is no more distasteful in a utility sense
than working at the private production technology.
What is the role of government in this economy? Since we are assuming
6no market imperfections, any and all government activity in this economy
reduces welfare. Government purchases of private sector output do not
contribute to private welfare by substituting for private consumption
purchases. Nor do they enhance the productivity of factors employed in the
private sector. Likewise the labor employed by the government does not
produce anything of value to the private sector. These admittedly extreme
assumptions considerably simplify the algebra in what follows without altering
the substance.3
Assuming that the government finances all of its activities using lump-
sum taxes, the competitive equilibrium in this economy can be obtained as the
solution to a simple planning problem. The first order conditions that
characterize the optimal allocations are




where 0; denotes differentiation with respect to the i'th argument and A, is
the Lagrange multiplier for the period t resource constraint. The
interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. The only important
decision that the representative agent faces is how much to work at the
private productive activity, given the demands of the government on his time
and final output and the available technology for converting the labor input
7into final output. The optimal supply of labor to private production equates
the marginal product of private effort to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure.
Following current national income accounting conventions, total
government purchases of goods and services in this economy are given by
where w t is the real wage, which in equilibrium is simply the marginal
(5)
product of labor. Clearly, this aggregate is not exogenous: shocks to the
production function that alter the marginal productivity of labor will cause
changes in r t even in the absence of changes in G t or N t
9
• It al so should be
noted that r t measures the true value (in real terms) of the resources
appropriated by the government. Government purchases of goods and services in
the national accounts may understate this total at times. Thus if the labor
employed by the government consists solely of military conscripts paid some
fixed wage, w t ' below the market wage, the measured total understates the
- 9 b true total by the amount (Wt - wt)Nt . This discrepancy is likely to e
particularly important in wartime but is of tangential importance for what
follows. 4
In the context of this model, GNP is defined as the sum of Gross
National Private Product (GNPP) and Gross National Government Product
(GNGP) :5,6
8GNP, == GNPP, + GNGP, (6)
GNPP is simply the output produced by the supply of factors to private
production activity (=F(K,N)). GNGP is by convention defined to be
compensation of employees in the government sector, which in this model simply
consist of wage payments, w,N:.
7 This convention reflects the fact that the
output of government is unobservable. Thus under current national accounting
conventions we can rewrite the expression for GNP as
GNP, = F(K"N,J + W,N,9 = F(K"N,) + DzF(K"N,)N,9 (7)
where I have simply substituted the marginal product of labor for the
equilibrium real wage. Under ideal circumstances, we would assume that the
output of the government sector is a function of the capital, Kg, and labor,
N9, employed in the sector, summarized by Fg(K9,Ng). In the special case
where F = Fg, GNP would be unaffected by the split of production between the
private and public sectors. We generally do not believe this to be the case,
however, if for no other reason than the absence of competition in the
government sector will typically cause factors to be employed relatively
inefficiently.
4. Analysis
To analyze the effects of changes in government purchases of final
9output or employment, it is convenient to linearize the model around the
equilibrium allocations.




N • N9 '9 =i, + YNJ<.t
• (9) - (LL Nt - (LL Nt + yNNNt
I-N -N9 1- N - N
9
eit + eNNt =ecCt + e/'t (10)
where (; = the elasticity of the marginal utility of i with respect to j for
i,j = C, L. Concavity of preferences impl ies that (cc and (LL < 0, and
(CC(LL- (LC(CL> O. Yij denotes the elasticity of the marginal product of i
with respect to j for i,j = K,N. The requirement that the production function
the elasticity of output with respect to i for i = K,N and is always positive.
The assumption of constant returns to scale means that ej also denotes the
share of factor i in the output of the private sector. Finally ej is the
share of final output allocated to j for j = C,G. The hats "A" denote
percentage deviations from equilibrium. All of the elasticity and share
parameters are evaluated at their equilibrium values.
10The system becomes more tractable if we make the simplifying assumption
that the utility function is separable.
9 In this case ~CL = ~lC =0, and we
only need to solve for C t and Nt simultaneously, since ~ is determined
recursively. SolVing the system under this assumption gives us the following




and e; denotes the elasticity of i with respect to j. e~ and e: are both
positive: an increase in the endowment of capital raises the equilibrium level
11of consumption; an increase in government purchases of private output raises
private employment.
C C N
EG , EN' and EN' are all negative: an increase in
government purchases of final output lowers consumption; an increase in
government employment also lowers consumption; and an increase in government
employment lowers private sector employment. The sign of E~ is ambiguous,
and depends among other things on the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor.
Note that there is a certain amount of symmetry in the response of
consumption to increased government purchases and the response of private
sector employment to increased government employment. In the special case
where the marginal utility of consumption is constant, ~cc = 0 and increased
government purchases of private sector output are offset one-for-one by a
reduction in consumption. With all of the extra government spending absorbed
in lower consumption, there is no need to increase production or work effort.
In this case,
so the multiplier, dC/dG, is equal to -1. Thus, higher government purchases
call forth no increase in production. It is worth noting that with separable
utility the condition that ~cc = 0 implies that there is no income effect on
leisure. Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) emphasize that the
existence of such an income effect is essential to generating multiplier
effects on output in a neoclassical model.
12Likewise, if the marginal utility of leisure is constant, ~LL = 0, and
an increase in public sector employment is offset one-for-one by a reduction
in leisure. Private sector employment is unchanged, as is private sector
output and consumption. Letting ~~. denote the elasticity of leisure with
respect to public sector employment, we obtain
=----
I-N-N9
Noting that L = 1- N - N9, the relevant multiplier is easily shown to be
dL/dN9 = -I.
Since labor is the only variable factor of production, the response of
private sector output (GNPP) to an increase in government purchases of output
will simply be the product of the elasticity of output with respect to labor
and the elasticity of private sector employment with respect to G (i.e.
GNPP N
~G =eN~G)' Likewise the response of private sector output to a change in
public sector employment will be the product of the elasticity of output with
respect to labor and the elasticity of private sector employment with respect
to public sector employment. Thus we obtain
13
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The point to note here is that the signs of these elasticities are
unambiguous: increased government purchases of private product raise private
sector output, while increased public sector employment lowers private sector
output. These results are intuitively plausible. The idea that increased
government purchases raise private sector output is a staple of macroeconomic
theories of all stripes. That increased government employment should lower
private sector output is also plausible, as long as we keep in mind that labor
is the only variable input to the production process.'o
It is straightforward to show that there is no real "multiplier" effect
of increased government purchases on private sector output. While output
rises in response to higher government purchases, it must always do so less
than one-for-one. As long as preferences exhibit some degree of curvature,
some part of any increase in government purchases will be absorbed in the form
of lower consumption, with the result that output increases less than
• ONPP b fAd government purchases. Notlng that Eo =eGdGNPp fdG, su stituting or ~ an
rearranging we can rewrite equation (13) as
dGNPP
dG
From this expression it is clear that the "multiplier" must lie between 0 and
141. With a constant marginal utility of consumption, all of the extra output
demanded by the government comes out of a reduction in consumption, and
production is unchanged. If both the marginal utility of leisure and the
margi na1 productivity of 1abor are constant, ~LL = YNN =0, and a11 of the
extra output demanded by the government is met by a one-for-one increase in
production with private consumption unchanged. In the more standard case with
diminishing marginal products and marginal utilities, the multiplier is less
than 1.
Analogously, increased public sector employment will generally produce a
less than one-for-one increase in total employment. If we let E denote total
employment (i.e. N + Ng) then it is straightforward to show that
dE
dNg
With a constant marginal utility of leisure, ~LL = 0 and an increase in
government employment raises total employment one-for-one. If both the
marginal utility of consumption and the marginal productivity of labor are
constant, ~cc = YN
N = 0, and all of the extra publ ic sector employment is
offset by a decline in private sector employment. Leisure remains unchanged.
More generally, the employment effects of an increase in government employment
will be to raise total employment by less.
5. Multiplier effects on GNP
Let us now examine the response of GNP to changes in government
15purchases and employment. From the definition of GNP in equation (7) above we
can show that
w where sp denotes the share of private sector output in total GNP and E;
denotes the elasticity of the real wage with respect to j = G,Ng.
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where ¢l = speN+ (l-SplYNN. Note that with constant returns to scale,
V NN = -VNK = ~K laNK' where 0KN denotes the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor in private sector production. The signs of these
elasticities are in general ambiguous because of the ambiguous sign of ¢l.
16The sign of the elasticity of GNP with respect to increases in government
purchases of final output depends on the sign of <1>. With a constant marginal
product of labor, YNN = 0 and an increase in government purchases of private
sector output will always raise GNP. Furthermore, the multiplier effects will
be the same, i.e. dGNP/dG = dGNPP/dG. More generally the multipliers are
related by dGNP /dG = (<I> /speN)dGNPP /dG.
The intuition for the critical role played by the marginal product of
labor is as follows. An increase in government purchases must be accompanied
by an increase in taxes, which lowers household income or wealth. With
leisure assumed to be a normal good, the supply of labor increases. The
demand for labor is fixed by the predetermined capital stock, so the effect on
the real wage is determined by the slope of the demand curve for labor. If
the labor demand curve is flat (as it will be if labor has a constant marginal
product), the real wage remains constant, which in turn means that the imputed
output of the government sector (WN9) is constant. In this case GNP rises
one-for-one with the increase in private sector output. More generally, the
real wage will fall in response to an increase in government purchases of
private sector output, leaving the net effect on GNP ambiguous.
Table 1 lists-the values of the critical term <I> for different values of
GKN , eN and sp' The possibility that increased government purchases of final
output will lower GNP is greater, the lower the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, the smaller the share of private sector output in
GNP and the smaller the elasticity of private sector output with respect to
171abor.
How likely is it that we will observe the perverse result of GNP falling
in response to an increase in government purchases? Table 2 presents
estimates of the parameters eN and sp for a small number of countries for
which the necessary data are available. Estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor are harder to come by, so we will
assume that it is equal to 1.
11 This assumption causes the expression for ~
to simplify to ~ = eN - (l-sp)' For developed countries it seems that the
most likely combination of parameter values would have eN> (I-s p)' The
average value of eN for the nine countries shown is 0.47, while the average
value of sp is 0.88.
While the possibility of different signed multipliers for GNP and GNPP
seems small, it is still the case that the multipliers will generally differ
in magnitude. Using the averages of the figures in Table 2, the elasticity of
GNP with respect to changes in government purchases of final product will be
about three-quarters (0.35/0.47) the elasticity of GNPP.
We have already noted that the elasticities of GNP and GNPP with respect
to public sector employment are related by
= (I-s ) p (I8)
Thus, even in the special case where the effects of a change in government
purchases of private sector output has the same effects on GNP and GNPP (i.e.
18when YNN = 0) the effects of a change in the amount of labor employed by the
government on GNP and GNPP will not be the same. In this case, the
multipliers are related by
d GNP
d NQ
= -!L d GNPP
speN d NQ
+ (I-s ) GNP
P NQ
Furthermore, it is theoretically possible that GNP will increase in response
to an increase in N Q • Assuming that 0KN = 1, this possibility comes down to
the requirement that eK is a lot bigger than eN' i.e. that the technology for
producing private sector output be relatively capital intensive. The
parameter values in Table 2 suggest that increases in public sector employment
lead to increases in GNP.
5. How it matters: Output during wartime
The distinction between GNP and GNPP is likely to be most important in
wartime, as it is during wars that we see the most dramatic variation in
government employment (and hence government "output"). The rates of growth of
GNP and GNPP from 1938 to 1955 are plotted Figure 1.
12 This period covers
World War II and the Korean War. Note the large differences in the estimates
of the growth rate of the economy during and immediately after World War II.
The rate of growth of private sector output fell steadily after 1941, while
the rate of growth of GNP exceeded 15.0 percent in 1942 and 1943, dropping to
8.2 percent in 1944. GNPP declined 2.1 percent in 1945 and 4.8 percent in
1946, and then grew 2.6 percent in 1947. By contrast, GNP fell 1.9 percent in
191945, a massive 19.0 percent in 1946, and 2.8 percent in 1947. Clearly, the
impression we get of how the economy behaved during and immediately after
World War II is substantially different depending on which measure of
aggregate output we focus on. Specifically, the 4.8-percent decline in GNPP
in 1946 looks a lot less like a postwar "depression" than the 19.0-percent
decline in GNP. Note that estimates of growth for the Korean War period are
less affected by the distinction.
Official estimates of GNP on an annual basis are only available from
1929. For the period prior to this date, there are three major alternative
unofficial series of figures going back to 1869, these being the estimates of
.
Kendrick (1961), Romer (1989) and Balke and Gordon (1989). The estimates of
Balke and Gordon, and Romer are considered superior to the older estimates of
Kendrick. Figure 2 illustrates growth rates of two measures of aggregate
output around World War I using the Balke and Gordon and Romer series.
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According to Romer's estimates, GNP grew 5.2 percent in 1918 after falling
slightly (0.5 percent) in 1917 (the United States declared war on April 6,
1917). By contrast, GNPP fell 3.4 percent in 1917 and 4.9 percent in 1918,
and then grew 8.4 percent in 1919. The Balke-Gordon estimates show GNP flat
in 1917, growing 7.7 percent in 1918, and then contracting in each of the
three subsequent years. The Balke-Gordon series shows the smallest decline in
GNPP over the course of the war (2.8 percent in 1917, 1.8 percent in 1918) and
smaller growth in GNPP in 1919 (3.1 percent) than the 8.4 percent estimated by
Romer. In short, while the details differ between the two series, the basic
point that the "shape" of the war-induced cycle in aggregate activity is
different depending on whether we look at total product or private sector
product continues to hold.
207. Multiplier estimates
Hall (1986) presents empirical results that suggest that there is no
multiplier effect from military spending to GNP. His estimates indicate that
each extra dollar of military purchases raise GNP by only 62 cents, i.e. less
that one-for-one. The analysis above suggests that military spending should
be decomposed into its goods and services components before estimating
multiplier type relationships, and that GNPP rather than GNP is a more
appropriate concept of aggregate output. Unfortunately, attempts to obtain
multiplier estimates based on a decomposition of military spending into goods
purchases and factor payments run into serious data problems. Constant dollar
estimates of total defense purchases and the various components thereof
(durable goods, nondurable goods etc.) are only available from 1972.
14 The
period since 1972 encompasses the end of the Vietnam war and the Carter-Reagan
defense buildup. Constant (1987) dollar estimates of compensation of
employees engaged in national defense and national defense purchases of goods
are plotted in Figure 3. Casual inspection of these plots should make us
pessimistic about finding strong relationships between the components of
military spending and aggregate output over this sample period - there is just
not enough variation in the key explanatory variables. This is borne out by
the regression results in Table 3. There I present estimates of the impact
effects of the two different types of military spending on GNP and GNPP.
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the absolute magnitude of the
effects of military spending on GNPP are greater than the effects on GNP. The
coefficient signs are as predicted: higher purchases of goods raise output,
increased appropriation of effort lowers it.
15 However, the standard errors
associated with the coefficient estimates are large, and we are unable to
21reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero.
7. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I outlined how government purchases of goods and services
affect output in a simple static neoclassical model. The composition of
government purchases was shown to be important in terms of how the output of
the private sector responds: increased purchases of private sector output
generally lead to increased production, while increased public sector
employment generally depresses private production. I also showed that under
standard assumptions about tastes and technology, there can never be a
multiplier effect in a static neoclassical model. As Baxter and King
correctly pointed out, output can only increase more than one-for-one with
increased government purchases when the capital accumulation decision is
endogenous.
The introduction of public sector employment into the analysis
necessitates that we distinguish between GNP as currently measured and private
sector output. Under current national accounting conventions, GNP understates
the expansionary effects on output of increased government purchases of goods.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1989) look at the effects of fiscal policy on Private
Value Added, which they define to be GNP less all government purchases of
goods and services. This is going too far, as government purchases of goods
are part of private product. It is not just in the analysis of fiscal policy
that care must be taken when confronting the predictions of neoclassical
models with aggregate data. Recent work by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
(1991) and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) has explored the implications of
extending the basic neoclassical real business cycle model to incorporate
22household production. The concept of aggregate market output in those models
is not the same as GNP because GNP includes an imputation for the services
provided by owner-occupied houses. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright and
Greenwood and Hercowitz recognize this when comparing the predictions of their
models with the data.
The distinction between GNP and private sector production is likely to
be most important when there are large changes in pUblic sector employment
(and thus measured government output). Such changes typically occur in and
around wartime. Casual empiricism yields a somewhat different impression of
U.S. output performance during World Wars I and II when we focus on private
sector production rather than GNP.
Finally I presented some evidence of the differential effects of
military purchases on output. While simple least squares parameter estimates
are consistent with the predictions of the theory, they are statistically
insignificant.
23Table 1
Values of ¢l = speN + (l-sp)YNN
sp
a'N = 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
eN = 0.33 -.505 -.171 -.004 .163 .33
0.50 -.25 .05 .20 .35 .50
0.67 .005 .271 .404 .537 1
a'N = 1
eN 0.33 -.17 .03 .13 .23 .33
0.50 0 .20 .30 .40 .50
0.67 .17 .37 .47 .57 .67
a'N = 2
eN 0.33 -.00025 .1305 .197 .2635 .33
0.50 .125 .275 .35 .425 .50
.67 .0825 .4195 .503 .5865 .67
24Table 2
eN Sp








United Kingdom 0.50 0.86
Note to Table 2. Data are from DECO Department of Economics and Statistics
National Accounts 1975-87 Volume II: Detailed Tables. eN is calculated as
the ratio [compensation of employees paid by resident producers to resident
households less compensation of employees in general government]/[GDP less GDP
originating in the government sector]. sp is calculated as the ratio [GOP




Dependant variable Al09 GNP Al09 GNPP
Constant 0.351E-2 0.366E-2
(0.134E-2) (0.149E-2)
Al09 GNP' l 0.368 -
(0.113)
Al09 GNPP_ 1 - 0.366
(0.113)
Al09 MILG 0.038 0.044
(0.030J (0.034)




Durbin's h 0.04 0.07
S. E. 0.009 0.011
T 1972:3-1990:4 1972:3-1990:4
Notes to Table 3. All data are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1986), and
Survey of Current Business, various issues.
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281.1 would like to thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
for comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
2.The US Commerce Department recently switched from emphasizing GNP to GOP as
its principal indicator of aggregate economic activity. In a closed economy
model such as the one considered in this paper the two measures are of course
identical. The points to be made in what follows apply to GOP as well.
3.It is possible to allow both G and N 9 to augment utility in an additive
manner, by writing the utility function as U(C,L)+V(G,N9), without altering
any of what follows.
4.See Oneal (1991) for a recent attempt to adjust estimates of military
spending in NATO countries to allow for conscription. Oneal shows that the
monetary value of conscription averaged 9.2 percent of military spending in
1974, declining to 5.7 percent in 1987. Eisner (1989) Table 5 presents
estimates of the uncompensated factor services of draftees for the period
1947-75 for the United States. In 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War,
compensation of employees in the military as reported in Table 3.7.A of U.S.
Department of Commerce (1986) was $21.7 billion. Eisner estimates the
uncompensated services of draftees that same year as amounting to $13.4
billion.
5.Note that in Table 40 of National Income 1954 Edjtjon GNP is split into
"Gross government product" (what I am calling GNGP) and "Other gross product"
(what I am calling GNPP).
6.GNP as computed by the Commerce Department also includes the imputed output
of the stock of residential housing. For the sake of simplicity, we will
abstract from the existence of a housing stock in this model.
7.See U.S. Department of Commerce (1985) for an overview of national
accounting methodology.
8.King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988a,b) analyze dynamic versions of models
similar to the one in this paper by linearizing around the steady state
equilibrium. The advantage of this approach, in addition to its simplicity,
is the ease with which we can see the relationship between the reduced form
parameters of the (linearized) model and the more fundamental parameters of
tastes and technology.
9.With nonseparable utility the signs of the various elasticities of interest
are unchanged as long as ~lC and ~Cl are both positive.
10.In a dynamic setting the capital input would also be variable.
11.This assumption is consistent with the observed constancy of factor shares
in total income over long periods of time.
2912.These figure do not reflect any adjustment for the effects the Draft during
either war. Thus GNP growth is probably understated, while GNPP growth is
probably overstated.
13.GNPP was estimated by subtracting Kendrick's estimates of Government
Product (Kendrick (1961) Table A-III) from the Romer and Balke-Gordon GNP
estimates.
I4.Constant dollar estimates of compensation of employees in national defense
are available from 1952.
I5.Note that the constant dollar series for compensation of employees engaged
in national defense is the relevant variable for measuring the amount of
effort appropriated by the government, as opposed to the number of people
employed in the military. The constant dollar compensation of employees
series is constructed by extrapolating base-year compensation by an index of
employment for military personnel and an index of hours worked for civilians
employed in national defense. In both cases, the extrapolaters are adjusted
for changes in the quality of the workforce. Thus the constant dollar
compensation of employees series captures both increases in the numbers of
workers employed in national defense and increases in the quality of workers
employed in national defense. It should be obvious that such a series is
preferable to one measuring only the numbers without any regard to quality.
Further we would expect that quality changes in military personnel were
particularly significant following the abolition of the draft in 1975. The
construction of constant dollar compensation of employees series is explained
in U.S. Department of Commerce (1988).
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